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Foreword
Nadine Strossen'
This timely Symposium focuses on the laws that recently have
been adopted by states all over the country as well as the U.S. Congress,
imposing new sanctions on convicted sex offenders. Named after the
New Jersey law that was enacted in 1994 in the wake of the brutal rape
and murder of 7-year-old Megan Kanka,2 these laws contain a range of
provisions, but public attention and legal controversy have centered on
two of them, which are also the center of this Symposium: "community
notification" provisions, which require or permit public notice that a
convicted sex offender who has served out his sentence is moving into
the community; and "sexual predator" commitment procedures, which
permit the involuntary, indefinite civil commitment of convicted sex
offenders after they have completed their prison sentences, based on the
prediction that they are likely to engage in future acts of sexual violence
and the finding that they suffer from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder (even though they are not diagnosed as mentally ill).
The U.S. Supreme Court will rule on the constitutionality of the
civil commitment aspects of Megan's Law this term in Kansas v.
Hendricks,3 thus resolving a conflict among the lower courts. Lower
court judges have reached differing conclusions as to whether this
1 Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil Liberties
Union. Professor Strossen would like to thank the following individuals for their research
and administrative assistance with this Foreword: her Chief Aide, Raafat S. Toss; her
Assistant, Lara Meinke; and her student Research Assistants Carol Pressman, Rubeena Lal,
and Alex Jeffries.
2 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-6 to -11 (West Supp. 1995).
3 Matter of Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P. 2d 129, cert. granted, 64
U.S.L.W. 3830, No. 95-1649 (June 18, 1996). The Supreme Court heard oral argument on
this case on December 10, 1996.
element of the law violates any or all of the following constitutional
guarantees: substantive due process, the Equal Protection Clause,
procedural due process, the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the ban on ex
post facto laws.'
Likewise, the lower courts that have considered constitutional
challenges to the community notification provisions of Megan's Law
have also reached divergent results on whether it violates any or all of
the same constitutional guarantees.5 No doubt the Supreme Court will
ultimately have to resolve this conflict as well.6 At stake are profound
4 See Matter of Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996)
(holding that Kansas' Sexually Violent PredatorAct violates substantivedue process rights);
In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993), rev'd, Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (D.
Wash. 1995) (granting writ of habeas corpus and rejecting challenge based on substantive
and procedural due process, and Double Jeopardy, Ex Post Facto, and Equal Protection
Clauses); Wisconsin v. Post, 541 N.W. 2d 115 (1995) (reversing, on all issues, Wisconsin
circuit court holding that Wisconsin law allowing post-sentence commitment of sex
offenders violates constitutional protections against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws,
as well as the guarantees of substantive due process and equal protection); In re Blodgett,
510 N.W. 2d 910 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 146 (1994) (rejecting challenge to
Minnesota's Psychopathic Personality Statute based on substantive due process and equal
protection guarantees).
5 Four courts have enjoined community notificationprovisions, pending full trials,
after reaching the preliminary conclusion that they violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. See
State v. Payne, 633 So. 2d 701, 703 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1993); Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp.
691 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 876 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J.
1995), rev'don other grounds, 81 F. 3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. Supp.
1372 (D. Alaska 1994). See also In re Reed, 663 P. 2d 216, 218 (1983) (holding that
misdemeanant's lifelong registration obligation violated California Constitution's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment). But see Doe v. Poritz, 662 A. 2d 367 (1995) (upholding law
as against claims that it violated Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder, and Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clauses). Accord, State v. Ward, 869 P. 2d 1062, 1070-71 (Wash. 1994) (en
banc) (same).
6 As one commentatar noted, if the Supreme Court upheld the civil commitment
aspect of Megan's Law, then the pressure to enforce the community notification aspect would
probably abate, since offenders considered to pose ongoing threats would likely be
committed rather than returned to the community. Joel B. Rudin, Megan's Law: Can it Stop
SexualPredators-andat What Cost to Constitutional Rights?, CRIM. JUST. (1996) at 3, 5.
As he cautioned, though, "[t]he effect on traditional civil liberties in this country would be
questions about the nature of punishment and the purpose of our
criminal justice system, as well as fundamental issues about the
constitutional constraints upon that system.
Even beyond these pressing moral and constitutional issues,
Megan's Law also raises important pragmatic and policy questions. Is
it an effective response to the tragic problem of sex crimes? Will it
provide meaningful protection to potential victims of such crimes,
including children? Is it cost-effective? And is it more effective-and
more cost-effective-than alternative strategies would be?
I have spelled out some of the essential policy questions
presented by Megan's Law because the public and political debate has
often ignored them, simply assuming or presuming-withoutanalysis or
evidence-that Megan's Law would be an effective approach to
protecting our children and communities from sexual offenses. The
"debate" in our legislative halls has too often proceeded on a rushed,
oversimplified,emotional level, without examining the law's underlying
premises, but rather simply assuming that it effectively protects the
public and penalizes pedophiles. As John Gibbons noted during the
Symposium, the original New Jersey Megan's Law itself was passed
under an emergency suspension of that state's legislative rules, with no
hearings in one house of the legislature and only limited hearings in the
other.7 Congress's consideration of the federal counterpart was equally
cursory.'
The political rhetoric that has fueled the recent Megan's Law
juggernaut at least implies that those who question the law's
constitutionalityor efficacy thereby elevate the privacy of convicted sex
incalculable. Indefinite preventive detention for other fomns of violent (or even nonviolent)
crimes surely would follow." Id.
7 Symposium, Critical Perspectives on Megan's Law: Protection vs. Privacy, 13
N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTS. 1, 57 n.331 (1997).
8 See Rudin, supra note 6, at 4. "in its speed to enact a mandatory public
notification provision-the legislation took all of two days to be introduced and enacted,
without amendment, in the House and the Senate-Congress did not stop to consider any
guidelines for how individual state notification statutes are to work." Id.
offenders above public fsafety-in particular,. the .safety. of young
children. Sometimes the rhetoric does more than imply this kind of
false-and dangerous-conflict between public safety and individual
rights. For example; one New York newspaper demonized a federal
judge who upheld a constitutional challenge to New York's version of
Megan's Law as "the pervert's pal."9
The presence of such inflammatory rhetoric, and the
concomitant absence of serious analysis, in the public discussion about
Megan's, Law clearly disserves the rights of convicted and released
offenders, who have paid their debt to society under the laws pursuant
to which they weresentenced. Moreover, equally disserved is society's
interest in assuring arational allocation of public resources to prevent
crime and to protect actual and potentialcrime victims. In fact, much
analysis and evidence suggests that Megan's Law is as unconstructive in
protecting the public's safety as it is destructive of the rights and
interests of released sex offenders. Consider, for example, the following
points that have been made, in support of the conclusion that the
community notification aspect of Megan's Law is at best.ineffective, and
at worst counterproductive, in combating sex crimes:
* These laws create a sense of panic on the part of parents
and children concerning the individuals about whom notice is
given.
* Because only a small minority of sexual offenses against
children are committed by strangers, these laws will give
children and their parents a false sense of security. Community
notification laws do not provide 'information about ,the
innumerable first-time, never-apprehended or unregistered
offenders. Therefore,. people must still be cautious in
9 Rogues Gallery ofJunkJudges, DAILY NEWS(New York), Mar. 31, 1996, at 40
(referringto Judge Denny Chin of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York).
supervising.and educating their children.
* Because community notification is likely to deter
offenders from registering with local law enforcement
authorities, it has the potential to render such registration
requirements worthless. Many sex offenders subjected to
community notification laws flee the notified community or
refuse to comply with the requirement, thus making it more
difficult for police to keep track of them.
* By ostracizing ex-offenders from the community, and
making them prey to vigilantism and harassment, the law
prevents their re-integration into society. Psychologists say that
what a sex offender needs to prevent re-offense is better
socialization, not the isolation that notification laws tend to
cause.
* Generally, pedophiles have difficulty relating to adults
and hence look to children for companionship and sexual
gratification. By ostracizing sex offenders, community
notification laws may reinforce their attraction toward children.
* The stress generated by community notification laws
may also drive offenders to re-offend. Studies indicate that
certain emotions-such as frustration, anger or sadness-trigger
deviant behavior. Since community notification laws stir these
emotions, they may trigger deviant behavior.'"
10 A number of the foregoing adverse impacts of community notification
requirements were well-stated in Rudin, supra note 6, at 8:
Offenders who lose theirjobs or are shunned by the community, who
are publicly humiliated and shamed, may go underground, moving to
large cities and trying to live anonymously. Parole and probation
authorities will be unable to provide these ex-offenders with the
structure and guidance of supervision or the benefit of psychological
treatment, while local police departments will lack the resources to
track them down. Rendered unemployable and unable to function in
society, deprived of any hope, such outcasts may be driven to commit
new sexual or other crimes. Id.
* Because predictions of a sex offender's propensity to re-
offend average a one-third accuracy rate, and because
community notification is generally required only concerning
those past offenders who are deemed likely to commit further
crimes, potentially dangerous sex offenders may well escape
community notification and live anonymously.
* Court-required due process procedures for offenders, as
well as cumbersome community notification and monitoring
procedures, are imposing substantial expenses upon local law
enforcement agencies, thus diverting resources from other
crime-control strategies not only in the area of sex offenses, but
also regarding crime more generally.
* A study of the Washington State community notification
law, the first such law in the country, indicated that the
notification had little effect on recidivism, in terms of either sex
offenses or crime in general."
* Conversely, no study of any community notification law
has indicated that it has had a positive effect on recidivism either
for sex crimes in particular or for crimes in general.
* Community notification obscures the real problem of
lack of treatment. As phrased by Ed Martone, Executive
Director of the ACLU of New Jersey, this is analogous to the
government warning the public that drinking water is tainted,
but not doing anything to treat the water.
Summarizing the adverse impact that community notification
will have on community safety-as well as on the rights of ex-
offenders-Jerome Miller, a national authority on corrections, wrote:
11 Donna D. Schram& Cherlyn Darling Milloy,CommunityNotification: A Study
ofOffenderCharacteristicsandRecidivism, prepared for the Washington State Institute for
Public Policy, Oct. 1995, at ii.
In the end, all the hot lines, leaflets, talk-show kitsch and
vigilantism won't slow the rate of sexual abuse. Precisely the
reverse. As troubled individuals are tagged and driven from
neighborhoods and families and friends and slip into that
nether world of isolation and trance that feeds perverse
fantasy, sexual offending can only grow more dangerous and
egregious. 12
The widespread, simplistic misconceptionthat Megan's Law pits
public protection against pedophiles' privacy is reflected in the subtitle
of this Symposium, "Protection vs. Privacy." Yet the bright-line
conflict that the Symposium title posits is, in fact, belied by the
information and evaluation presented in the Symposium itself. More
accurate is the Symposium's main title, since the Symposium does
indeed provide "critical perspectives" on the law. And these perspectives
are diverse, critically examining the subtitle's suggested dichotomy from
all sides. Thus, not only do some contributions criticize the assumption
that Megan's Law will effectively protect public safety; correspondingly,
some contributions criticize the assumption that Megan's Law will
substantially undermine privacy and other interests of convicted sex
offenders.
Unfortunately, the New Jersey Legislature, the U.S. Congress,
and other legislative bodies that rushed to enact these laws with scant if
any hearings or discussion were not informed by the kind of constructive
exchange that occurs in this Symposium. At least that exchange should
serve as an important source of ideas and information for the judges,
policymakers, scholars, and members of the public who are now taking
a sober second look at these laws.
12 Jerome G. Miller, Why the Scarlet "A" Works Against Us, Los ANGELES TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1994, at B7.

